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Abstract 
This paper presents a conceptual framework to analyse the design of the cost-effectiveness 
appraisal process of new health care technologies. The framework characterises the appraisal 
processes as a diagnostic test aimed at identifying cost-effective (true positives) and non-cost-
effective (true negative) technologies. Using the framework, factors that influence the value 
of operating an appraisal process, in terms of net gain to population health, are identified. The 
framework is used to gain insight into current policy questions including: i) how rigorous the 
process should be; ii) who should have the burden of proof; and iii) how optimal design 
changes when allowing for appeals, price reductions, resubmissions and re-evaluations.  
The paper demonstrates that there is no one optimal appraisal process and the process should 
be adapted over time and to the specific technology under assessment. Optimal design 
depends on country-specific features of (future) technologies, e.g. effect, price and size of the 
patient population, which might explain the difference in appraisal processes across countries. 
It is shown that burden of proof should be placed on the producers and that the impact of price 
reductions and patient access schemes on the producer´s price setting should be considered 
when designing the appraisal process. 
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1. Introduction 
Cost-effectiveness analysis has become a key decision criterion in reimbursement and 
implementation decisions for new health care technologies in many countries (Heintz et al., 
2016; Kanavos et al., 2011). Determining the cost-effectiveness of new technologies is often 
the responsibility of governmental agencies like, for example, the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) in England and Wales, The Scottish Medicines Consortium 
(SMC) in Scotland and The Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV) in Sweden. 
These agencies mainly rely on analyses performed and submitted by producers of a new 
technology, which are then reviewed by the agencies or third party evaluation groups 
(Sculpher, 2010; Kanavos et al., 2010). A key reason for agencies not relying solely on 
producer submissions is that producers have incentives to overestimate the cost-effectiveness 
of new technologies to improve the likelihood of achieving reimbursement, and producer 
cost-effectiveness estimates has been shown to differ significantly from independent 
assessment estimates (Barbieri et al., 2009; Miners et al., 2005; Bell et al., 2006; Chauhan et 
al., 2007).  
Agencies have limited time and resources available to conduct their appraisals but this varies 
across countries. The SMC has 18 or 22 weeks and TLV has 180 days to conduct their own 
internal review and to make a reimbursement decision; whereas, under current arrangements, 
NICE has 35 weeks, under the Single Technology Appraisal (STA) process, to publish a 
recommendation, which includes WKHH[WHUQDO³Evidence Review *URXS´(ERG) assessment1 
(NICE, 2014; TLV, 2016). Restricting the time and resources that such agencies have 
available to conduct their reviews is likely to reduce the precision of the cost-effectiveness 
                                                 
1
 The NICE STA timelines are changing for technologies submitted for review after April 1st 2017 undergoing 
WKHVKRUWHU³IDVWWUDFN´SURFHVVRU³FRPPHUFLDOGLVFXVVLRQV´between the NHS England and the company (NICE, 
2017a; NICE, 2017b). 
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assessment. Hence, there is a trade-off between the time and resources available to appraisal 
organisations and the accuracy of the cost-effectiveness appraisal process, in terms of 
correctly identifying cost-effective and non-cost-effective technologies (Bell, 2015; Kanavos 
et al., 2010; Kaltenthaler et al., 2008; Barham, 2008). There is limited research on this trade-
off between resources expended on and accuracy of cost-effectiveness appraisals.  
The purpose of this paper is to set up an analytic framework that enables analysis of different 
ways to design the cost-effectiveness appraisal of new technologies. The framework will be 
used to analyse and address some policy-relevant considerations including: i) How should the 
process be designed to maximize population health; and ii) what factors influence how to 
design the process optimally.  
The next section outlines the framework where the cost-effectiveness appraisal is viewed as a 
diagnostic test aimed at identifying cost-effective technologies (true-positives) and non-cost-
effective technologies (true-negatives). Section 3 utilises the framework to analyse how to 
design and operate an appraisal process optimally and to make some policy relevant 
conclusions. The paper ends with a discussion and concluding remarks.  
2. The conceptual framework  
Within healthcare, cost-effectiveness is often assessed by comparing the incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER) with the cost-HIIHFWLYHQHVV WKUHVKROG Ȝ, which represents the 
marginal productivity of the health care sector (Drummond et al., 2015; Claxton et al., 2010). 
More effective tHFKQRORJLHVZLWKDQ ,&(5EHORZȜDV LQEquation 1 below (ZKHUHǻ&DQG
ǻ( UHSUHVHQWV LQFUHPHQWDO FRVW DQG HIIHFW, respectively), will have a positive impact on 
population health if implemented and vice versa (Briggs et al., 2006; Claxton et al., 2015). 
  (1) 
OO '
'
E
CICER
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2.1. True- vs. claimed-ICER 
Technologies with higher ICERs and ICERs above the Ȝhave a higher likelihood of being 
deemed non-cost-effective and rejected2 (George et al., 2001; Rawlins & Culyer, 2004; 
Devlin & Parkin, 2004; Dakin et al., 2015). Producers therefore have an incentive to claim 
that the ICER is EHORZȜ, even if this is not the case. Producers are able to claim lower ICERs 
by FODLPLQJKLJKHU¨(and/RUORZHU¨&WKURXJKoptimistic assumptions, selective analysis of 
data or otherwise utilising their informational advantage about the new technology. Here the 
claimed-ICER is defined as the ICER claimed by producers in their reimbursement 
submissions; and the true-ICER is defined as the ICER based on true or unbiased estimate of 
¨(DQG¨&. Figure 1 presents possible combinations of claimed- and true-ICERs.  
Figure 1 about here 
The 45° line shows where the claimed-ICER is equal to the true-ICER. Truly cost-effective 
technologies will be located to the OHIWRIWKHYHUWLFDOȜOLQHLQDUHDs 1, 2 or 3) and non-cost-
effective technologies will be located to the right (in areas 4, 5 or 6). It seems unlikely that 
producers will, in general, put forward a claimed ICER above the KRUL]RQWDO Ȝ OLQH LH
indicate that a technology is non cost-effective. It is, therefore, to be expected that almost all 
technologies undergoing appraisal will have a claimed-,&(5EHORZȜDQGbe located in area 2, 
3 and 4.  
Ideally decision makers would identify whether each technology lies to the left or the right of 
WKHYHUWLFDOȜDQGEDVHWKHLUGHFLVLRQVWRUHMHFWRUDSSURYHRQWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQ. However, the 
true-ICER is never known with complete certainty at the time of cost-effectiveness appraisal, 
or at any other time, due to uncertainty around the costs and effects of implementing of a new 
technology into clinical practice. Also, appraisal organisations are generally unable to 
                                                 
2
 We restrict our analysis to more effective technologies, i.e. ǻ( > 0, with no loss of generality. 
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postpone reimbursement decisions or commission further research to get a better estimate of 
the true-ICER (Griffin et al., 2011; McCabe et al., 2010; McKenna et al., 2015). Appraisal 
organisations must, therefore, base their decisions on the submitted claimed-ICER and their 
own best estimate of the ICER, i.e. the appraisal-ICER, at the time of the appraisal.  
2.2. The cost-effectiveness appraisal as a diagnostic test 
There are three appraisal options in broad terms for appraisal organisations to choose. One 
extreme is to simply trust the information put forward by the producers and to approve all 
technologies with a claimed-,&(5 EHORZ Ȝ *LYHQ producers¶ incentives to claim ICERs 
below ȜWKLVDSSURDFKZRXOGlikely lead to all new technologies being deemed cost-effective 
and approved. The other extreme option is to distrust producer submissions completely and to 
reject them all. Of course the latter would be very unpopular and political pressure or 
legislation are unlikely to allow for this. Both extremes are highly inaccurate, but low cost 
appraisal processes. A third alternative is trying to deduce which of the submitted 
technologies are actually cost-effective and which are not cost-effective. This third approach 
taken by most, if not all, appraisal organisations can be characterised as a diagnostic test 
aimed at identifying cost-effective technologies. Figure 2 outlines the outcomes and payoffs 
of having a diagnostic test.   
Figure 2 about here 
2.2.1. Outcomes 
As seen in Figure 2, the outcome of the test can either be positive (Test+), i.e. technologies 
are deemed cost-effective, or negative (Test-), i.e. deemed to be not cost-effective. A positive 
test outcome can either be a true-positive (TP), i.e. the technology is deemed cost-effective 
and has a true-ICER below Ȝ; or a false-positive (FP), i.e. the technology is deemed cost-
effective but has a true-ICER above ȜTrue-positives are cost-effective technologies that are 
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correctly identified as being cost-effective, whereas false-positives are technologies that are 
identified as being cost-effective but are actually not cost-effective. Similarly, a negative test 
outcome can be either true-negative (TN), i.e. the technology is deemed to be not cost-
effective and has a true-ICER above Ȝ; or a false-negative (FN), i.e. the technology is deemed 
to be not cost-effective but has a true-ICER below Ȝ.  
The accuracy of diagnostic tests in terms of identifying true-positives and true-negatives is 
commonly presented in terms of sensitivity and specificity, defined as (Pagano & Gauvreau, 
1993): 
Sensitivity = p = true positive rate, i.e. probability of classifying a cost-effective 
technology as cost-effective 
1-p = false-negative rate, i.e. probability classifying a cost-effective technology as 
non-cost-effective 
Specificity = q = true negative rate i.e. probability of classifying a non-cost-effective 
technology as non-cost-effective 
 1-q = false-positive rate, i.e. probability of classifying a non-cost-effective technology 
as cost-effective 
How an appraisal process is operated in terms of sensitivity and specificity determines the 
outcome and payoff from utilising the appraisal process, which is demonstrated in Section 3. 
2.2.2. Payoffs 
Figure 2 displays the payoffs to population health and producer surplus from having a 
diagnostic test. The payoff functions demonstrate that the gains from operating an appraisal 
process are dependent on (in addition to the accuracy of the test) incremental net benefit 
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(INB)3 per patient; time of relevance, i.e. time of reimbursement approval (tĲ) until loss of 
relevance (T); and the incidence of the disease being treated (It), which, combined, make up 
population INB4.  
The payoff functions also show that the cost of operating an appraisal process is comprised of 
two parts: i) a monetary cost of performing the test (CAgency and CProducer); and ii) a time-
related cost equal to the health and producer surplus foregone due to later implementation at 
time tĲ instead of time of availability (t0).  
Prices set by producers determine payoffs, since prices determine ǻ& and thus INB. Hence, 
the optimal appraisal process is dependent on the prices set by producers, which is analysed 
further in Section 3. 
2.3. Sensitivity and specificity in cost-effectiveness appraisal 
In relation to cost-effectiveness assessment, sensitivity and specificity describe the ability of 
the appraisal process correctly to identify cost-effective (true-positive) and non-cost-effective 
(true-negative) technologies. Sensitivity and specificity are likely to be related to the true-
ICER, since the further the true-ICER is above or below Ȝ, the higher the probability is for the 
                                                 
3
 Incremental net benefit can be defined as either incremental net health benefits (INHB) or incremental net 
monetary benefits (INMB) in the following way (Stinnett & Mullahy, 1998; Tambour et al., 1998):  
O
CEINHB ''  and CEINMB '' O*   
4
 Population incremental net benefit (INBpopulation) is based on aggregation of patient incremental net benefit 
(INBpatient) for the time of relevance, i.e. from reimbursement approval (tĲ) until loss of relevance (T), and 
number of patients, given the incidence (It), for which the technology is relevant: ܫܰܤ௣௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡ ൌ ܫܰܤ௣௔௧௜௘௡௧ כ෍ ܫ௧ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻ௧்௧ୀᡄ  
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appraisal organisation to come to the correct conclusion, ceteris paribus. This is exemplified 
in Figure 3 below, which presents the probability of a positive cost-effectiveness appraisal 
outcome (p[test+]) as a function of the true-ICER (p[test+]-curve) based on an exemplified 
appraisal process Į specified in Appendix 1.  
Figure 3 about here 
Technologies in the area below the curve (A and C) are considered to be cost-effective and 
those above the curve (B and D) are considered non-cost-effective. Of the technologies below 
the curve, those in area A are truly cost-effective (true-positives), whereas those in area C are 
non-cost-effective (false-positives). Similarly, technologies not considered cost-effective in 
area B are actually cost-effective (false-negatives), whereas those in area D are truly non-cost-
effective (true-negatives). 
There are several reasons why an appraisal process might come to the wrong conclusion 
regarding the cost-effectiveness of technologies. One example of technologies located in B 
(false-negatives) is cost-effective technologies (true-,&(5  Ȝ with an underestimated 
treatment effect that results in an appraisal-,&(5DERYHȜ$QRWKHUH[DPSOH LV technologies 
that are considered non-cost-effective due to high uncertainty around the ICER due to, for 
example, uncertainty or limited evidence about effect or cost, but where further research 
shows that the true-,&(5LVEHORZȜ.  
Sensitivity is equal to ஺஺ା஻, and specificity is equal to ஽஼ା஽ 5. Figure 3, as well as the following 
analysis, assumes that the probability of positive cost-effectiveness appraisal outcome 
                                                 
5
 To be able to specify specificity (and 1-specificity) as ஽஼ା஽ it is necessary to define some upper bound for D. 
Otherwise D would be boundless and ௧௥௨௘ିூ஼ாோ՜ஶሺ ஽஼ା஽ሻ ൌ ͳ and ௧௥௨௘ିூ஼ாோ՜ஶሺ ஼஼ା஽ሻ ൌ Ͳ, regardless of the 
size of C. ,QWKHIROORZLQJQXPHULFDOH[DPSOHVWKHXSSHUOLPLWLVGHILQHGDVȜEXWLWFRXOGMXVWDVZHOOEHVHWDW
10* Ȝ6HWWLng an upper limit does not change the accuracy of the process only how accuracy is calculated and 
reported.  
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dependents mainly on the true-ICER and, to a lesser extent, on factors such as, for example, 
the claimed-ICER. 
2.3.1. Accuracy vs. cost and sensitivity vs. specificity trade-off. 
Appraisal organisations can increase sensitivity and specificity, i.e. ஺஺ା஻ and ஽஼ା஽, by operating 
a more accurate appraisal process. This is exemplified by the p[test+]-curve for the more 
accurate appraisal process ȕ1 shown in Figure 4.a. Increased accuracy could be achieved by 
waiting until more relevant evidence becomes available or increasing the level of scrutiny, i.e. 
doing more detailed assessment, further modelling or additional literature reviews. Ideally, 
appraisal bodies would like to have a (zero cost) test with perfect accuracy, i.e. with 
sensitivity and specificity equal to 16. However, improving the accuracy of the appraisal 
process comes at the expense of a higher monetary (CAgency) and/or time cost (t0-tĲ), whereby 
there is a trade-off between the accuracy and the cost of operating an appraisal process.  
Figure 4 about here 
Appraisal organisations can also choose to increase sensitivity or specificity without 
increasing scrutiny or otherwise changing the process. This can be done by changing the 
definition of what is considered to be cost-effective. Appraisal organisations can do this by 
allowing for more (or less) uncertainty around ICER estimates. This could, for example, be 
done by including the outcome from probabilistic sensitivity analyses (PSA) or value of 
information analysis (VOI) in the cost-effectiveness assessment (Griffin et al., 2011; Claxton, 
1999). Setting specific limits for the percentage of simulations in PSA that are required to be 
EHORZ Ȝ VHWWLQJ OLPLWV IRU WKH maximum proportion of simulated ICERs that has ³KLJK´
valuHVHJDERYH[ȜRUVHWWLQJPD[LPXPOHYHOVRI92,WKDWZLOOEHDFFHSWHGDUHGLIIHUHQW
                                                 
6
 In contrast, the producer would prefer a process with sensitivity equal to 1 and specificity equal to 0, which is 
equivalent to approving all technologies. This demonstrates how appraisal organisations and producers have 
different incentives in terms of how the appraisal process should be designed. 
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ways that appraisal organisations can set, and change, their definition of what is considered 
cost-effective7.  
Accepting more uncertainty around the ICER would lead to more technologies being 
considered cost-effective and thus increase sensitivity ( ஺஺ା஻) but reduce specificity ( ஽஼ା஽ሻ. This 
is exemplified by curve Į2 in Figure 4.b. Similarly, appraisal organisations can implement 
more strict criteria for what is considered cost-effective leading to more technologies being 
determined as non-cost-effective, i.e. decreasing sensitivity and increasing specificity, as 
exemplified by curve Į3 in Figure 4.b.  
The relationship between sensitivity and specificity within diagnostic tests is often expressed 
in a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (Pagano & Gauvreau, 1993). Figure 4.c 
represents the ROC-curve for the appraisal process Į and the more accurate SURFHVVȕ. The 
shape of ROC-curves is determined by the accuracy of the test. Tests that are better than pure 
chance will have a concave shape and the ROC-curve for a more accurate test will lie above 
the curve of a less accurate test.  
A p[test+]-curve represents one specific sensitivity and specificity combination and thus one 
point on a ROC-curve. The points Į, Į, and Į3 on ROC-curve Į in Figure 4.c correspond to 
the different p[test+]-curves Į, Į2, and Į3 in Figure 4.b. Moving along the ROC-curve 
represents different sensitivity and specificity combinations and hence different p[test+]-
curves that the appraisal organisation can choose between when operating a given appraisal 
process. 
                                                 
7
 For example, if appraisal organisations require that RI36$VLPXODWLRQVDUHȜWKHQPRUHWHFhnologies 
will be deemed not-cost-HIIHFWLYHFRPSDUHGWRDUHTXLUHPHQWRIRIVLPXODWHG,&(5VEHLQJȜ6LPLODUO\
UHTXLULQJ WKDW RQO\RI VLPXODWHG ,&(5VFDQEH! [Ȝ ZLOO OHDG WR IHZHU WHFKQRORJLHVEHLQJGHHPHGFRVW-
effective, compared to allowing IRUPRUHVLPXODWHG,&(5VHVWLPDWHVEHLQJ![Ȝ6HWWLQJ ORZPD[LPXP92,
limits that will be accepted will, likewise, lead to more technologies being deemed not-cost-effective, compared 
to allowing for higher VOI estimates.  
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Defining the cost-effectiveness appraisal as a diagnostic test demonstrates that finding the 
optimal design of the cost-effectiveness appraisal process is a trade-off between accuracy 
versus cost, i.e. finding the optimal ROC-curve shape. It can further be concluded that the 
question of how to best operate a given appraisal process, with certain time and resource 
constraints, is a matter of finding the optimal sensitivity and specificity combination, i.e. 
determining the optimal point on a given ROC-curve. In the following section we will use this 
framework to analyse how best to design and to operate the appraisal process in order to 
maximise population health. 
3. How to design and to operate the cost-effectiveness appraisal 
process  
In this section, we analyse how best to design the appraisal process, under the assumption that 
SURGXFHUV¶ price setting is exogenous to the appraisal process. The assumption about 
exogenous price setting will be relaxed in the final part of the analysis, which also assesses 
how allowing for appeals, pricing agreements, resubmissions and re-evaluations impacts 
optimal design.  
3.1. How to operate a specific appraisal process to maximise population 
health 
Getting the most health from utilising a given appraisal process is a question of finding the 
optimal sensitivity and specificity combination. However, the optimal sensitivity and 
specificity combination is dependent on the INB of future technologies, since the value of 
correctly identifying cost-effective and non-cost-effective technologies depends on the 
number and INB of future technologies. Figure 5 presents a stylised example demonstrating 
how the optimal way to operate the appraisal process is endogenous to the population INB of 
future technologies and thus to prices set by producers. ,QWKLVH[DPSOHWKHSURFHVVĮZRXOG
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be operated optimally, in terms of population health, at sensitivity and specificity combination 
ĮDQGĮ, given ICER distribution I and II, respectively.  
Figure 5 about here 
In general it can be said that the optimal point will move upwards and to the right along the 
ROC-curve (increasing sensitivity and decreasing specificity) when the value of identifying 
cost-effective technologies increases, i.e. when there is a higher proportion, larger patient 
population (It) or time relevance (T-Ĳ IRU Fost-effective technologies vs. non-cost-effective 
technologies, and vice versa. Hence, there is no one optimal way to operate an appraisal 
process in terms of sensitivity and specificity. 
3.1.1. Burden of Proof 
An issue that can restrict the way in which an appraisal process can be operated is 
requirements for appraisal organisations to provide proof of technologies¶ cost-effectiveness, 
i.e. the burden of proof. If appraisal organisations are obligated to ensure that cost-effective 
technologies are identified, then they must operate the process towards the top (right) end of 
ROC-curve with high sensitivity; because only then can appraisal organisations ensure that 
(most) cost-effective technologies are identified. Similarly, if appraisal organisations are 
obligated to ensure that non-cost-effective technologies are identified, then the process has to 
be operated on the left (and bottom) side of the ROC-curve. 
In either case, placing the burden of proof on the appraisal organisation will restrict the way in 
which the process can be operated and is likely to result in suboptimal operation of the 
appraisal process. In contrast, if it is up to producers to provide proof of cost-effectiveness 
then appraisal organisations are free to choose the (optimal) sensitivity and specificity 
combination.  
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3.2. Optimal design of an appraisal process 
As previously discussed, population health benefits from operating an appraisal process are 
improved by increasing accuracy. However, a more accurate process comes at a higher 
monetary (CAgency) and/or time cost (t0-tĲ), whereby the gains of a more accurate process must 
be weight against the increased cost.  
Improving the accuracy will reduce the NB forgone from false-negatives and lost from false-
positives. The opportunity cost of false-negatives and the cost of false-positives is dependent 
on the population INBs of the technologies that are incorrectly rejected and accepted. Hence, 
the value of increased accuracy is dependent on the population INBs and proportion of future 
cost-effective and non-cost-effective technologies. Since the value of improving accuracy is 
dependent on the population INBs of future technologies, there is no one optimal level of 
accuracy. 
Still some insight can be gained into when it might be valuable to trade-off time and money 
for a more accurate process. The impact of false-positives and false-negatives increases when 
the population INBs of these technologies are large. Hence, the value of improving accuracy 
increases when: i) technologies have larger patient populations and/or longer time of 
relevance, which increase the loss from incorrect decisions; and ii) there is larger uncertainty 
around the ICER estimate leading to higher likelihood of incorrect decisions. Increasing 
accuracy can reduce the likely inefficiency of operating the appraisal process with a specific 
level of sensitivity or specificity; thereby increasing the value of operating a more rigorous 
cost-effectiveness appraisal when burden of proof is placed on appraisal organisations.  
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3.3. Pricing of future technologies might be endogenous to the appraisal 
process  
The previous sections have demonstrated that optimal design and operation of an appraisal 
process is dependent on the population INB of future technologies. There is reason to believe 
that the design and operation of the appraisal process might influence the price setting of 
future technologies, whereby the INB of future technologies might be endogenous to the 
appraisal process. 
Technologies with lower true-ICERs have higher probability of being deemed cost-effective 
compared to technologies with higher true-ICERs. This implies that producers face a trade-off 
between setting a higher price (and ICER) to collect higher producer surplus if approved and 
setting a lower price (and ICER) to increase the probability of being deemed cost-effective. 
Since the design and operation of the appraisal process determines the probability of positive 
cost-effectiveness appraisal, i.e. the p[test+]-curves, changing the design or operation of the 
process may change pricing incentives. This is exemplified in Figure 6 which utilises the 
numerical example to present expected producer surplus (E[Producer surplus]) as a function 
of the true-ICER for the two different p[test+]-curves ĮDQGĮ.  
Figure 6 about here  
In this example, operating the test at a lower point on the ROC-curve changes SURGXFHUV¶
incentives from pricing above Ȝ to pricing below Ȝ, assuming that producers will set the price 
to maximise expected producer surplus. However, the lower sensitivity from operating at a 
lower point on the ROC-curve also reduces the ability to detect and accept truly cost-effective 
technologies. Appraisal organisations must, therefore, find the point on the ROC-curve that 
balances the trade-off between incentivising producers to put forward cost-effective 
technologies and the ability to detect and accept cost-effective technologies. 
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Improving accuracy and thereby sensitivity and/or specificity increases producers¶ incentives 
WRSULFHEHORZȜsince this increases the expected producer VXUSOXVRISULFLQJEHORZȜDQGRU
reduces the expected producer surplus RI SULFLQJ DERYH Ȝ. Therefore, when producer price 
setting is endogenous to the appraisal process, the gain from improving accuracy is twofold: i) 
correctly identifying more truly cost-effective and non-cost-effective technologies; and ii) 
increasing incentives for cost-effective price setting. Still, the benefits of improving accuracy 
must be weighed against the cost from operating a more rigorous process.  
3.4. 7KHDSSUDLVDOSURFHVVPD\QRWEHD³RQH-RIIWHVW´ 
The analysis has so far characterised the appraisal process as a one-off test. In this section we 
relax this assumption and analyse how appeals, price agreements, resubmissions and re-
evaluations influences optimal design of the appraisal process.  
3.4.1. Appeals  
Having an appeal process can reduce the loss from false-negatives and false-positives. Given 
the informational advantage that producers hold and the cost of appealing, producers are 
probably more likely to appeal false-negatives compared to payers appealing false-positives. 
Hence, introducing appeals will probably reduce the loss from false-negatives more than the 
loss from false-positives making it optimal to increase the proportion of false-negatives 
compared to false-positives, i.e. operating the appraisal process on a lower point on the ROC-
curve with higher specificity and lower sensitivity. 
Producers may also appeal true-negatives to have a second go at getting non-cost-effective 
technologies approved. All this should be taken into consideration when designing the appeal 
process, even if the main benefit of an appeal process might be the procedural value and to 
avoid long and expensive court cases.  
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3.4.2. Price agreements and resubmissions 
It is important to distinguish between three types of price agreements: pre-, during- and post-
appraisal agreements. Pre-appraisal agreements are basically just a lowering of the (effective) 
price of a new technology. During-appraisal price reductions allow producers to adjust the 
price during the appraisal, which producers may choose to do if they are informed that the 
technology will be rejected at the current price. Post-appraisal price reductions could be used 
if producers get a negative appraisal and are able to resubmit for a new appraisal with a lower 
price. Allowing for during- and post-appraisal agreements can, therefore, turn true-negatives 
and false-negatives into true-positives (and false-positives).  
If price setting is endogenous to the appraisal process then allowing during- and post-
appraisal agreements could lead to negative pricing incentives, i.e. incentivise producers to set 
higher prices and put forward more non-cost-effective technologies and then adjust the price 
during the process. Further, if the appraisal organisation has RYHUHVWLPDWHG ¨( or 
underestimated ¨C it may lead to false-positives where producers still charge a price that 
results in true-ICERs DERYHȜ.  
Appraisal organisations can decrease the negative pricing incentives of appeals, pricing 
agreements and resubmissions by making it more costly to utilise these options. Not allowing 
during-appraisal price reduction but only for resubmissions with lower price or otherwise 
increasing the monetary and/or the time cost of these options, are some options to increase the 
cost to producers.  
3.4.3. Re-evaluations 
Many appraisal organisations utilise conditional approvals and re-evaluations (Stafinski et al., 
2010). These options enable review and reversal of past decisions, which can reduce the loss 
from false-positives. With a lower cost of false-positives it will be optimal to accept more 
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technologies, i.e. operating on a higher point on the ROC curve with higher sensitivity and 
lower specificity. The framework indicates that the best candidates for re-evaluations will be 
technologies with large patient populations, long time of relevance and high uncertainty 
around the ICER, since these technologies have high consequence or risk of incorrect 
decisions.  
4. Discussion 
The framework outlined in this paper demonstrates that there is no one optimal way to design 
and to operate the cost-effectiveness appraisal of new health care technologies. The trade-off 
between accuracy and cost of the appraisal process implies that even a (hypothetical) process 
with 100% accuracy is unlikely to be optimal, assuming decreasing marginal returns of 
improving accuracy. Optimal design and operation depend on the population INB and thereby 
price, size of patient population and the time of relevance of the technologies that will 
undergo assessment. Optimal design will, therefore, change over time, whereby it is important 
that the operational and legal framework ensures continuous evaluation and adjustment of the 
cost-effectiveness appraisal process over time.  
Our results further indicate that it may be valuable to adjust the process according to the 
specific technology being assessed. $ µRQH VL]H ILWV DOO¶ DSSUDLVDO SURFHVV LV OLNHO\ WR EH
inefficient, and may be improved by a flexible approach directing time and resources to 
appraisals where they are expected to provide most value. For example, a more accurate 
process may be warranted when technologies have large patient populations or will be used 
for many years, since these factors increase the cost of incorrect decisions, and vice versa. 
This may justify the recent changes to the NICE process, i.e. spending less time and resources 
LQWKH³IDVWWUDFN´DSSUDLVDORIWHFKQRORJLHVZLWKDQH[SHFWHG,&(5EHORZ0,000 per QALY 
WKDWKDYHDOLPLWHGEXGJHWLPSDFWEXWVSHQGLQJDGGLWLRQDOWLPHDQGUHVRXUFHVRQ³FRPPHUFLDO
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GLVFXVVLRQV´EHWZHHQSURGXFHUVDQGWKH1+6IRUWHFKQRORJLHVZLWKVLJQLILFDQWEXGJHWLPSDFW
i.e. above £20m (NICE, 2017a; NICE, 2017b). However, much depends on the detail of how 
such arrangements will be implemented. In particular, how an expected ICER below £10,000 
ZLOOEHYHULILHGDQGWKHDGGLWLRQDODFFXUDF\IRUµKLJKSULRULW\¶DSSUDLVDOVZLOOEHGHOLYHUHG 
If pricing of technologies is exogenous to the appraisal process, our analysis shows that 
optimal design and operation is a two-part optimisation problem of accuracy versus cost and 
sensitivity versus specificity. The first part relates to selecting an appraisal process design 
(which determines the shape of the ROC-curve in the conceptual framework); and the second 
part, considers the optimal way to operate a given process (finding the optimal point on a 
particular ROC-curve in the conceptual framework). If pricing is endogenous to the appraisal 
process the optimal design of the process becomes more complex and may be characterised as 
a game, where appraisal organisations need also to consider producers¶ reactions to the design 
and operation of the appraisal process. The widespread use of international reference pricing, 
and focus on price differences across countries, makes price reductions due to single country 
appraisal design less likely, at least in European countries given potential price and revenue 
spill-over to other countries (Kanavos et al., 2010; Danzon et al., 2005). However, the ability 
of producers to offer country-specific and confidential discounts, and the fact that decisions 
made by some appraisal bodies, like for example NICE, may influence other appraisal bodies 
decisions, increase the likelihood of producers adjusting prices to increase the probability of 
approval (Sculpher, 2010; Kennedy, 2009). Assessment of the endogeneity between the 
appraisal process and SURGXFHUV¶ price setting, therefore, needs to be considered on a country 
level when designing of the appraisal process.  
The endogeneity between price setting and the appraisal process and the determinants of 
population INB (size of the patient population, current clinical practice, and price setting) will 
vary between countries. Our framework therefore indicates that the optimal appraisal process 
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ought to differ between countries, which may explain the observed variation in appraisal 
processes across countries. For example, the larger population of the UK and the fact that 
NICE¶V decisions are referenced by other countries could explain why the NICE process has 
been longer and includes the extensive external ERG review, compared to the shorter and 
most likely less rigorous SMC and TLV processes in Scotland and Sweden, respectively. 
However, research is needed to evaluate if differences in appraisal processes across countries 
can be explained by different assessments of the optimal sensitivity versus specificity and 
accuracy versus cost trade-offs; or whether other factors explain observed differences in cost-
effectiveness appraisal processes.  
Many countries allow producers to propose during- and post-appraisal price reductions, for 
example, in the form of confidential discounts or patient access schemes (Kanavos et al., 
2011; Kanavos et al., 2010). These are attractive policies since they enable the approval of 
technologies that would otherwise have been deemed non-cost-effective and rejected. 
However, our analysis demonstrates how these price agreements may increase producers¶ 
incentives to price above the threshold. Authorities should, therefore, consider how they can 
minimise these adverse pricing incentives when discounts or patient access schemes are part 
of the process. 
The framework underlines an important distinction regarding handling of uncertainty in cost-
effectiveness assessments: i) reducing uncertainty, i.e. accuracy versus cost; and ii) how to 
take uncertainty into account, i.e. sensitivity versus specificity. Given time and resource 
constraints, appraisal organisations seldom have the possibility of reducing uncertainty (for 
example, through commissioning additional research) and, instead, need to decide on how to 
take uncertainty into account (Griffin et al., 2011). Sensitivity analysis, and the display of 
uncertainty using cost-effectiveness acceptability curves/frontiers, plays a key role in 
quantifying uncertainty in cost-effectiveness appraisals (Heintz et al., 2016; Claxton, 2008). 
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Even though these are standard parts of most cost-effectiveness assessments today, the way in 
which these are used as decision criteria, and ultimately determine the proportion of false-
positive and false negatives, needs further clarification and consideration, informed by recent 
work in this area (Claxton et al., 2012; Claxton et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2012). 
There is increasing focus RQ³IDVWDFFHVVWRPHGLFLQHV´(European Medicines Agency, 2015b; 
European Medicines Agency, 2015a; Accelerated Access, 2015; U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services et al., 2014). Given the trade-off between accuracy and time/cost, our 
analysis indicate that the move toward faster access is likely to increase the number of false-
positive and/or false-negatives. It would, therefore, be relevant to study the population health 
effect of speeding up the access to new medicines.  
Our framework assumes that cost-effectiveness assessment is based solely on the 
expected/appraisal ICER and the cost-effectiveness threshold. Even though cost-effectiveness 
has been shown to be the strongest predictor of the reimbursement recommendations made by 
NICE (Dakin et al., 2015), this is naturally a simplification of the appraisal process. The 
framework can be extended to incorporate different cost-effectiveness thresholds, as for 
example employed by NICE with the end-of-life criteria (Paulden et al., 2014; Stewart et al., 
2014), or threshold as a function of, for example, disease severity and/or medical need, as 
appear to be employed in for instance Sweden and the Netherlands (Franken et al., 2014; 
Franken et al., 2012; Liliemark et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the conclusions and policy 
implications drawn from the simple framework presented in this paper are expected to hold, 
even when increasing the complexity with several or varying thresholds.  
In conclusion, based on our analysis we draw some important policy conclusions: i) there is 
no one optimal appraisal process and the appraisal should be adapted over time and to the 
specific technology under assessment; ii) how price reductions and patient access schemes 
impact producer´s price setting has to be considered when designing the appraisal process; iii) 
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burden of proof should be on the producers; and iv) PSA and VOI decision rules can be used 
to adjust the sensitivity and specificity combination of the appraisal process. This underlines 
the need for further and continued analysis of how to design and adapt the appraisal process 
over time.   
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Figures 
Figure 1. Possible combinations of claimed- and true-ICERs 
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Figure 2. Decision tree outlining the three different appraisal approaches and corresponding 
payoffs  
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Figure 3. Probability of positive cost-effectiveness appraisal (p[test+]) as a function of the 
true-,&(5EDVHGRQDSSUDLVDOSURFHVVĮLQ$SSHQGL[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Figure 4. (a) Probability of positive cost-effectiveness appraisal as a function of the true-ICER 
IRUSURFHVVĮDQGȕE3UREDELOLW\RISRVLWLYHcost-effectiveness appraisal as function of true-
,&(5IRUSURFHVVĮDWGLIIHUHQWVHQVLWLYLW\DQGVSHFLILFLW\FRPELQDWLRQVĮĮDQGĮF
5HFHLYHURSHUDWLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLF52&FXUYHIRUSURFHVVĮDQGȕEDVHGRQSURFHVVĮDQGȕ
defined in Appendix 1) 
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Figure 5. (a) Expected incremental net health benefits (E(INB)) as function of the sensitivity 
and specificity combinations of (the ROC-FXUYHRISURFHVVĮDQG,&(5GLVWULEXWLRQV,DQG,,
7KHSRLQWVĮĮQGĮUHSUHVHQWVWKHVHQVLWLYLW\DQGVSHFLILFLW\FRPELQDWLRQVZKHUH
population health is maximised given ICER distributions I and II, respectively; (b) ICER 
distribution I and II. (based on the numerical example in Appendix 1) 
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Figure 6. (a) and (b) Expected producer surplus (E(producer surplus)) as function of true-
ICER given the p[test+]-FXUYHVĮDQGĮUHVSHFWLYHO\EDVHGRQSURFHVVĮDQGQXPHULFDO
example in Appendix 1) 
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Appendix 1 
Characteristics of technologies notation value 
Incremental QALY gain of the new technologies ¨( 0.5 
Production and distribution cost of the new technologies (£) MCNew 100 
Cost of using the current technology (£) CAlternative 1,000 
&DOFXODWLRQRI¨& 
 
¨& ,&(5¨( 
Calculation of INB (INHB) 
 
I1+% ¨(-¨&ʄ 
Calculation of Producer Surplus 
 
¨&&alternative -MCNew 
 
The numerical example assumes that all new technologies have the same ¨( The ¨& LV
HVWLPDWHG EDVHG RQ ¨( DQG an ICER drawn from the ICER distribution. When estimating 
producer surplus we assume that revenue gained from the new technology is equal to ¨&
+Calternative. This assumes that there is no other relevant cost associated with using the new or 
the old technology. This was assumed to simplify the numerical example but potentially leads 
to an overestimation of producer surplus. However, this simplification has no effect on the 
interpretation of the numerical example or the general learnings from this framework. 
Characteristics of the appraisal process notation value 
Sensitivity p 0.9 
Specificity q 0.7 
Monetary cost of the appraisal process to the public (£) Cagency 100,000 
Monetary cost of the appraisal process to producers (£) Cproducer 150,000 
 
Additional information needed notation value 
Cost-effectiveness threshold (£/QALY) Ȝ 30,000 
Yearly patient incidence/patient population I 5,000 
Discount rate (%) r 3.50% 
Life time of the new technologies (years) T 10 
Time point at which a decision is reached 
when using the appraisal process (years) Ĳ 1 
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ICER distributions Ture-ICER distribution =  
Probability mass function 
I   Gamma(2.5; 10,000) 
II  Gamma(7; 5,000) 
 
P[test+]-curves 
 P[test+] = 1-CDF (CDF is the 
cumulative density function) 
WƌŽĐĞƐƐɲ EŽŵĂů;ʅ͖ϭϴ͕ϬϬϬͿ 
ɲ ? ʅсϯϱ͕ϬϬϬ 
ɲ2 ʅсϰϴ͕ϬϬϬ 
ɲ3 ʅсϭϴ͕ϬϬϬ 
WƌŽĐĞƐƐɴ EŽƌŵĂů;ʅ͖ϵ͕ϬϬϬͿ 
When estimating sensitivity and specificity for ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐɲ 
and ɴ an upper true-/ZůŝŵŝƚŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ? ?ʄ ?Ŷ
upper limit is needed since specificity would otherwise 
be equal to or close to 1 regardless of the performance 
of the test, as described in footnote 3.  
 
